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1 Introduction
The concept of strategic complementarity was first developed in a cardinal form, around
the notion of a supermodular function (Topkis, 1978, 1979; Veinott, 1989; Vives, 1990;
Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Milgrom and Shannon (1994) gave the idea an ordinal
expression and obtained a neat characterization result, Theorem 4.
For our purposes here, that result is better perceived as two independent statements,
related to “type B,” respectively, “type A” problems in the terminology of Quah (2007).
First (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994, Corollary 1), the set of optimal choices depends on
the sublattice of available choices in a monotone way if and only if the utility function
is quasisupermodular. Second, if a quasisupermodular utility function is perturbed, the
set of optimal choices from every sublattice ascends if and only if the single crossing
conditions hold.
In the standard model of a strategic game, where each player’s utility depends on the
choices of others but the strategy set does not, Milgrom and Shannon’s necessity result
does not mean that we cannot have increasing best responses without the quasisuper-
modularity of preferences. Indeed, there are weaker sufficient conditions in the literature
(Kukushkin et al., 2005, Lemma 3.1).
This paper has resulted from an attempt to develop an analog of Milgrom and Shan-
non’s Theorem 4 for situations where no comparison between optimal choices from dif-
ferent sets is ever made. In a sense, the attempt was successful, but necessity has to be
interpreted in a much broader sense: the immersion of a given optimization problem into
various parametric settings has to be considered. Quasisupermodularity is partitioned
into four independent constituent parts, each of which is necessary and sufficient (in that
sophisticated sense) for a kind (actually, two kinds) of the monotonicity of optima.
Section 2 reproduces the standard notion of a choice function generated by the maxi-
mization of a binary relation; in Section 3, we consider a number of extensions of an order
from points to subsets, which provide various ways to define an increasing correspon-
dence. In Section 4, a range of single crossing conditions is formulated and their (rather
straightforward) connections with the monotonicity of optima on chains are described.
Section 5 contains the definitions of four partial versions of quasisupermodularity and the
proofs of their basic properties. The central results of the paper are collected in Section 6;
concluding remarks, in Section 7.
2
2 Preferences and choice
Throughout the paper, we assume a set A of alternatives given. There is an agent whose
preferences over the alternatives are expressed by a binary relation Â on A, which is
assumed to be an ordering, i.e., irreflexive, transitive, and negatively transitive (z 6Â y 6Â
x ⇒ z 6Â x). Then the “non-strict preference” relation º defined by y º x ­ x 6Â y is
reflexive, transitive, and total.
Orderings can also be defined in terms of representations in chains: Â is an ordering if
and only if there is a chain C and a mapping u : A→ C such that y Â x ⇐⇒ u(y) > u(x)
for all x, y ∈ A (then y º x ⇐⇒ u(y) ≥ u(x)). The most usual assumption in game
theory is that the preferences of a player are described by a utility function u : A → R.
Here we work in a purely ordinal framework, so it is natural to replace R with an arbitrary
chain.
As is usual in decision theory, we allow for the possibility that only a subset X ⊆ A
may be available for choice. The set of all subsets of A is denoted BA. Given X ∈ BA,
we define
M(X,Â) := {x ∈ X | @ y ∈ X [y Â x]} = {x ∈ X | ∀ y ∈ X [x º y]}, (1)
the set of maximizers of Â on X. Clearly, M(X,Â) 6= ∅ whenever X is a finite nonempty
subset of A. We do not restrict ourselves to finite subsets here; nor do we study more
general conditions for the existence of maximizers. Very formally speaking, we view an
empty set M(X,Â) as no worse than a nonempty one. A rationalization for this attitude
is given in Section 3 below. A very helpful observation is that y Â x whenever Â is an
ordering, x, y ∈ X, and x /∈M(X,Â) 3 y (“revealed preference”).
With game-theoretic applications in mind, we consider parametric families 〈Ât〉t∈T of
orderings on A; the parameter t may be interpreted as (an aggregate of) the choice(s) of
other agent(s). Given a parametric family and X ∈ BA, the best response correspondence
RX : T → BX ⊆ BA is defined in the usual way:
RX(t) :=M(X,Ât) . (2)
Admittedly, the preferences of a player in the standard strategic game model are
described by an ordering on X×T rather than by a parametric family of orderings on X.
It is impossible to study, say, strong equilibria or the (in)efficiency of Nash equilibria in the
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latter framework. On the other hand, a parametric family of orderings is adequate when
the subject is the existence of a Nash equilibrium or the behavior of individual adaptive
dynamics. Some twenty five years ago, Olga Bondareva argued that the proper definition
of a non-cooperative game must stipulate that each player is only able to compare strategy
profiles differing in her own choice. Although one does not have to accept this, rather
extreme, view, there is something in it.
3 Monotonicity
We always assume A to be a partially ordered set (a poset). Most often, it is a lattice, in
which case LA denotes the set of all sublattices of A. The exact definitions are assumed
commonly known. Given a lattice A and x, y ∈ A, we denote L(x, y) := {x, y, x∨y, x∧y},
the minimal sublattice of A containing both x and y; clearly, #L(x, y) ∈ {1, 2, 4}.
The reversal of an order (y < x­ x > y) produces an order again; moreover, a lattice
remains a lattice. Having proved a theorem, we can replace, in all assumptions and the
statement itself, the relations and operations >, ≥, ∨, etc. with <, ≤, ∧, etc., and obtain
another valid theorem. The use of this simple observation (referred to as “duality”) leads
to considerable economy in the total length of proofs.
When considering a parametric family of preference relations, we assume that T is
also a poset. A mapping r : T → A is increasing if r(t′) ≥ r(t) whenever t′ > t; when
it comes to correspondences R : T → BA, we have to extend the order from A to BA.
Following Veinott (1989), we consider a few ways to do so for a lattice A:
Y ≥∧ X ­ ∀y ∈ Y ∀x ∈ X [y ∧ x ∈ X]; (3a)
Y ≥∨ X ­ ∀y ∈ Y ∀x ∈ X [y ∨ x ∈ Y ]; (3b)
Y ≥Vt X ­ [Y ≥∨ X & Y ≥∧ X]; (3c)
Y ≥wV X ­ ∀y ∈ Y ∀x ∈ X [y ∨ x ∈ Y or y ∧ x ∈ X]. (3d)
Another relation can be defined on any poset:
Y >> X ­ ∀y ∈ Y ∀x ∈ X [y ≥ x]. (3e)
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Clearly, Y >> X implies every other relation (3). None of the relations is an order, even
on nonempty subsets: >> and ≥Vt are antisymmetric and transitive, but generally not
reflexive; neither ≥wV, nor ≥∧ or ≥∨ need even be transitive.
Let≥∗ denote one of the relations (3) and T be a poset. A correspondences R : T → BA
is increasing w.r.t. ≥∗ if R(t′) ≥∗ R(t) whenever t′ > t. Veinott (1989) called correspon-
dences increasing w.r.t. ≥Vt (≥wV) in this sense (weakly) ascending.
Such monotonicity is closely related to the existence of monotone selections from R
[i.e., increasing mappings r : T → A such that r(t) ∈ R(t) for every t ∈ T ], provided
R(t) 6= ∅ for all t. If a correspondence R : T → BA is increasing w.r.t. >>, then every
selection from R is increasing. If R is increasing w.r.t. ≥∧, ≥∨, or ≥wV, then an increasing
selection exists under a completeness assumption about every value R(t) (Veinott, 1989,
Theorem 3.2; Kukushkin, 2009, Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 1); naturally, a stronger
assumption is needed in the last case. If R is increasing w.r.t. ≥Vt, then no completeness
assumption at all is needed provided A is a sublattice of the Cartesian product of a finite
number of chains (Kukushkin, 2009, Theorem 2).
Remark. When the order on A is reversed, Y ≥∧ X transforms into X ≥∨ Y , Y ≥∨ X
into X ≥∧ Y , and Y ≥∗ X into X ≥∗ Y for ≥∗ defined by (3c), (3d), or (3e).
We are interested in conditions on the preferences ensuring monotonicity, w.r.t. one or
another of the relations (3), of correspondences RX defined by (2). The monotonicity of a
single correspondence RX may happen just “by accident”; however, when a wide enough
class of admissible subsets X is taken into account, necessity results become obtainable.
Separation between existence and monotonicity is possible because each of the relations
(3) holds trivially if either Y or X is empty (non-existence cannot spoil monotonicity).
An ordering Â on a poset A is (strictly) increasing if y º x (y Â x) whenever y > x;
dually, Â is (strictly) decreasing if y º x (y Â x) whenever x > y. The well-known
Szpilrajn theorem asserts the existence of a strictly increasing total order on every poset.
When the preferences are increasing or decreasing, most of the following becomes trivial.
Naturally, we are interested in less straightforward connections between preferences and
order.
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4 Single crossing
It is well known that the “single crossing” conditions of various kinds (Milgrom and
Shannon, 1994) are important for the monotonicity of best responses. Those conditions
are most conveniently presented with the help of a ternary relation on the set of binary
relations on a given set: “B1 is closer to B0 than B2 is”; similar observations were made
by Quah and Strulovici (2007) and Alexei Savvateev (a seminar presentation, 2007). In
the following, the role of B0 is always played by the basic order on A, while B1 and B2
are (strict or non-strict) preference relations.
Let Â and Â′ be orderings on a poset A. We consider four conditions:
∀x, y ∈ A [y > x & y Â x⇒ y Â′ x]; (4a)
∀x, y ∈ A [y > x & y º x⇒ y º′ x]; (4b)
∀x, y ∈ A [y > x & y º x⇒ y Â′ x]; (4c)
∀x, y ∈ A [y > x & y Â x⇒ y º′ x]. (4d)
Each condition defines a binary relation on the set of orderings on A. The first two are
preorders. The third is transitive, but generally not reflexive. The last relation need not
even be transitive.
Given a poset A and a parametric family U = 〈Ât〉t∈T of orderings on A, we say
that U satisfies the lower single crossing condition if (4a) holds for Ât as Â and Ât′ as
Â′ whenever t, t′ ∈ T and t′ > t. Similarly, U satisfies the upper, strict, or weak single
crossing condition if (4b), (4c), or (4d) holds under the same circumstances. We say that
U satisfies the single crossing condition if it satisfies both upper and lower single crossing
conditions. Our terminology coincides with that of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) when U
is represented by a utility function (they did not define the lower, upper, and weak single
crossing conditions, though).
For more convenience in further referencing, we consider four “reversed” versions of
conditions (4):
∀x, y ∈ A [y < x & y º x⇒ y º′ x]; (5a)
∀x, y ∈ A [y < x & y Â x⇒ y Â′ x]; (5b)
∀x, y ∈ A [y < x & y º x⇒ y Â′ x]; (5c)
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∀x, y ∈ A [y < x & y Â x⇒ y º′ x]. (5d)
It is easily checked that each condition (5) is equivalent to the corresponding condition
(4) after the exchange of the roles of Â and Â′. Therefore, the (upper, lower, strict, or
weak) single crossing conditions could be defined with references to (5) as well.
Remark. It is easy to see that conditions (5a), (5b), (5c), and (5d) are dual to (4b), (4a),
(4c), and (4d), respectively.
Proposition 4.1. Let A and T be posets, and U = 〈Ât〉t∈T be a parametric family of
orderings on A. Then the following statements are equivalent.
1. U satisfies the lower single crossing condition.
2. There holds RX(t′) ≥∧ RX(t) whenever t′, t ∈ T , t′ > t, and X ∈ BA is a chain.
3. There holds RX(t′) ≥∧ RX(t) whenever t′, t ∈ T , t′ > t, and X ∈ BA is a chain
with #X = 2.
Proof. Let Statement 1 hold, t′, t ∈ T , t′ > t, and X ∈ BA be a chain. We have to show
RX(t′) ≥∧ RX(t); let y ∈ RX(t′) and x ∈ RX(t). If y ≥ x, we are home immediately; let
x > y. If y ∈ RX(t), we are home again. If y /∈ RX(t), then x Ât y, hence x Ât′ y by (4a),
contradicting the assumption y ∈ RX(t′).
Let Statement 1 be violated: there are t′, t ∈ T and x, y ∈ A such that t′ > t, y > x,
y Ât x, but x ºt′ y. Then we defineX := {x, y} and immediately obtain x ∈ RX(t′)\RX(t)
while RX(t) = {y}, hence RX(t′) ≥∧ RX(t) does not hold, i.e., Statement 3 is invalid.
Proposition 4.2. Let A and T be posets, and U = 〈Ât〉t∈T be a parametric family of
orderings on A. Then the following statements are equivalent.
1. U satisfies the upper single crossing condition.
2. There holds RX(t′) ≥∨ RX(t) whenever t′, t ∈ T , t′ > t, and X ∈ BA is a chain.
3. There holds RX(t′) ≥∨ RX(t) whenever t′, t ∈ T , t′ > t, and X ∈ BA is a chain
with #X = 2.
The proof is dual to that of Proposition 4.1.
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Proposition 4.3 (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). Let A and T be posets, and U =
〈Ât〉t∈T be a parametric family of orderings on A. Then the following statements are
equivalent.
1. U satisfies the single crossing condition.
2. There holds RX(t′) ≥Vt RX(t) whenever t′, t ∈ T , t′ > t, and X ∈ BA is a chain.
3. There holds RX(t′) ≥Vt RX(t) whenever t′, t ∈ T , t′ > t, and X ∈ BA is a chain
with #X = 2.
The equivalence immediately follows from Propositions 4.1 and 4.2.
Proposition 4.4. Let A and T be posets, and U = 〈Ât〉t∈T be a parametric family of
orderings on A. Then the following statements are equivalent.
1. U satisfies the strict single crossing condition.
2. There holds RX(t′) >> RX(t) whenever t′, t ∈ T , t′ > t, and X ∈ BA is a chain.
3. There holds RX(t′) >> RX(t) whenever t′, t ∈ T , t′ > t, and X ∈ BA is a chain
with #X = 2.
Proof. Let the strict single crossing condition hold, t′, t ∈ T , and t′ > t. We have to show
RX(t′) >> RX(t); let y ∈ RX(t′) and x ∈ RX(t). If y ≥ x, we are home; let x > y.
We have x ºt y since x ∈ RX(t); applying (4c), we obtain x Ât′ y, which contradicts
y ∈ RX(t′).
Let the strict single crossing condition be violated: there are t′, t ∈ T and x, y ∈ A
such that t′ > t, y > x, y ºt x, but x ºt′ y. Then we define X := {x, y} and immediately
obtain y ∈ RX(t) while x ∈ RX(t′), hence RX(t′) >> RX(t) does not hold.
Proposition 4.5. Let A and T be posets, and U = 〈Ât〉t∈T be a parametric family of
orderings on A. Then the following statements are equivalent.
1. U satisfies the weak single crossing condition.
2. There holds RX(t′) ≥wV RX(t) whenever t′, t ∈ T , t′ > t, and X ∈ BA is a chain.
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3. There holds RX(t′) ≥wV RX(t) whenever t′, t ∈ T , t′ > t, and X ∈ BA is a chain
with #X = 2.
Proof. Let the weak single crossing condition hold, t′, t ∈ T , and t′ > t. We have to show
RX(t′) ≥wV RX(t); let y ∈ RX(t′) and x ∈ RX(t). If y ≥ x, we are home; let x > y. We
have to show that either y ∈ RX(t) or x ∈ RX(t′). Since x ∈ RX(t), we have x ºt y. If
y ºt x as well, we have y ∈ RX(t); otherwise, we apply (4d), obtaining x ºt′ y, which
implies x ∈ RX(t′).
Let the weak single crossing condition be violated: there are t′, t ∈ T and x, y ∈ A
such that t′ > t, y > x, y Ât x, but x Ât′ y. Then we define X := {x, y} and immediately
obtain RX(t) = {y} while RX(t′) = {x}, hence RX(t′) ≥wV RX(t) does not hold.
5 Quasisupermodularity
Naturally, one does not have to be satisfied with maximization on chains, although scalar
strategies are met in economics models most often. The necessity of single crossing con-
ditions, obviously, holds on any class of admissible subsets that contains all finite chains
(but not otherwise, see Quah and Strulovici, 2007). The sufficiency is less robust.
Example 5.1. Let A := {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} ⊂ R2, T := {0, 1}, and a function
u : A × T → R be defined by the following matrices (the axes are directed upwards and
rightwards):
t = 0[
4 0
0 3
] t = 1[
5 4
0 6
]
Clearly, u satisfies the strict single crossing condition, even the strictly increasing differ-
ences condition. However, RA(0) = {(0, 1)}, while RA(1) = {(1, 0)}. Therefore, RA is
not increasing w.r.t. any relation (3); there is no monotone selection either.
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) called a function u on a lattice A quasisupermodular if
∀x, y ∈ A [sign(u(x ∨ y)− u(y)) ≥ sign(u(x)− u(x ∧ y))]. (6)
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The condition is purely ordinal and can easily be reformulated in terms of a preference
ordering (Alexei Savvateev, a seminar presentation, 2007):
∀x, y ∈ A [x Â y ∧ x⇒ y ∨ x Â y]; (7a)
∀x, y ∈ A [x º y ∧ x⇒ y ∨ x º y]. (7b)
We replace conditions (7) with a conjunction of four independent conditions:
∀x, y ∈ A [x Â y ∧ x⇒ [(y ∨ x Â y) or (y ∨ x Â x)]]; (8a)
∀x, y ∈ A [y º y ∨ x⇒ [(y ∧ x º x) or (y ∧ x º y)]]; (8b)
∀x, y ∈ A [x º y ∧ x⇒ [(y ∨ x º y) or (y ∨ x º x)]]; (8c)
∀x, y ∈ A [y Â y ∨ x⇒ [(y ∧ x Â x) or (y ∧ x Â y)]]. (8d)
Remark. Each condition (8) holds trivially when x and y are comparable in the basic
order.
Proposition 5.2. An ordering on a lattice satisfies both conditions (7) if and only if it
satisfies all conditions (8).
Proof. The necessity is obvious. To prove the sufficiency, we suppose the contrary. Let
x Â y ∧ x, but y º y ∨ x; then y ∨ x Â x by (8a), hence y Â y ∧ x by transitivity, which
contradicts (8b). The proof of the equivalence (7b) ≡ [(8c) & (8d)] is dual.
Example 5.3. Let A := {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} ⊂ R2; we consider four orderings on
A represented by these matrices (the axes are directed upwards and rightwards):
a.
[
0 0
1 2
]
b.
[
2 2
0 1
]
c.
[
1 0
2 2
]
d.
[
2 1
0 0
]
.
The ordering represented by the matrix “a” satisfies all conditions (8) except (8a), and
similarly with other matrices.
To obtain characterization results for preferences ensuring monotonicity of RX for
sublattices X ∈ LA, we have to modify the problem itself. The sufficiency parts of
Propositions 4.1–4.5 can be interpreted as the monotonicity of the correspondenceM(X, ·)
w.r.t. relations (4) on the set of orderings when X is a chain. Here, each condition (8) is
shown to be necessary and sufficient for a kind (actually, two kinds) of such monotonicity
on sublattices.
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Proposition 5.4. Let A be a lattice and Â be an ordering on A. Then the following
statements are equivalent.
1. Â satisfies (8a).
2. There holds M(X,Â′) ≥∧ M(X,Â) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(4a) holds on X.
3. There holds M(X,Â′) ≥wV M(X,Â) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(4d) holds on X.
4. There holdsM(X,Â′) ≥∧ M(X,Â) whenever X ∈ LA, #X ≤ 4, and Â′ is an ordering
on A such that (4a) and (4b) hold on A.
5. There holds M(X,Â′) ≥wV M(X,Â) whenever X ∈ LA, #X ≤ 4, and Â′ is an
ordering on A such that (4a) holds on A.
Proof. The implications Statement 2⇒ Statement 4 and Statement 3⇒ Statement 5 are
obvious.
Statement 1 ⇒ Statement 2. Let (8a) and (4a) hold. We have to show that y ∧ x ∈
M(X,Â) whenever y ∈ M(X,Â′) and x ∈ M(X,Â). Supposing the contrary, we have
x Â y ∧ x, hence y ∨ x Â y by (8a) and the optimality of x. Therefore, y ∨ x Â′ y by (4a),
contradicting the optimality of y.
Statement 1 ⇒ Statement 3. Let (8a) and (4d) hold. We have to show M(X,Â′) ≥wV
M(X,Â); let y ∈M(X,Â′) and x ∈M(X,Â). If y∧x ∈M(X,Â), we are home; otherwise,
x Â y ∧ x, hence y ∨ x Â y by (8a) and the optimality of x. Therefore, y ∨ x º′ y by (4d),
hence y ∨ x ∈M(X,Â′).
Statement 4 ⇒ Statement 1. Let (8a) be violated: there are x, y ∈ A such that
x Â y ∧ x, but y º y ∨ x and x º y ∨ x. Without restricting generality, x º y. We define
X := L(x, y), so y ∧ x /∈ M(X,Â) 3 x, and Y := {z ∈ A | z ≥ y}; our assumptions
imply x /∈ Y . Then we define an ordering Â′ on A: it coincides with Â on A \ Y and
on Y , whereas z′ Â′ z whenever z /∈ Y 3 z′. Both (4a) and (4b) are obvious: Whenever
z′ > z, z′ º z, and z ∈ Y , we have z′ ∈ Y as well. Meanwhile, y ∈ M(X,Â′), hence
M(X,Â′) ≥∧ M(X,Â) does not hold, i.e., Statement 4 is invalid.
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Statement 5⇒ Statement 1. Let (8a) be violated. We pick x and y as in the previous
paragraph, define X := L(x, y), so y ∧ x /∈ M(X,Â) 3 x again, and then define Â′ in the
same manner, but with Y := {z ∈ A | z Â y & z > y} ∪ {y}. Clearly, M(X,Â′) = {y},
hence M(X,Â′) ≥wV M(X,Â) does not hold. Since Â′ and Â satisfy (4a), Statement 5 is
invalid.
Proposition 5.5. Let A be a lattice and Â be an ordering on A. Then the following
statements are equivalent.
1. Â satisfies (8b).
2. There holds M(X,Â) ≥∧ M(X,Â′) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(5a) holds on X.
3. There holds M(X,Â) >> M(X,Â′) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(5c) holds on X.
4. There holdsM(X,Â) ≥∧ M(X,Â′) whenever X ∈ LA, #X ≤ 4, and Â′ is an ordering
on A such that (5c) holds on A.
Proof. Let (8b) hold, x ∈M(X,Â′) and y ∈M(X,Â). Let us show that y ∧ x ∈M(X,Â′)
if (5a) holds. Supposing the contrary, we have x Â′ y ∧ x, hence x Â y ∧ x by (5a). Since
y º x, (8b) implies that y ∨ x Â y, which contradicts the optimality of y. Let us show
that y ≥ x if (5c) holds. Supposing the contrary, we have x > y ∧ x; since y º y ∨ x and
y º x, we have y ∧ x º x by (8b). Therefore, y ∧ x Â′ x by (5c), which contradicts the
optimality of x.
Let (8b) be violated: there are x, y ∈ A such that x Â y ∧ x and y Â y ∧ x, but
y º y∨x. Without restricting generality, y º x; we define X := L(x, y), so y ∈M(X,Â).
Then we define an ordering Â′ on A in the same manner as in the proof of Proposition 5.4,
but with Y := {z ∈ A | z ≤ x}. On every equivalence class E of º′, we pick a strictly
increasing total order ÀE, existing by the Szpilrajn theorem. Then we define Â′′ as a
lexicography: z′ Â′′ z if z′ Â′ z, or if they belong to the same equivalence class E and
z ÀE z′. Clearly, Â′′ is a total order. Let z′ > z and z′ º′′ z, hence z′ Â′′ z. By the
definition of Â′′, we have z′ Â′ z. If z′ ∈ Y , then z ∈ Y as well, hence z′ Â z; if z′ /∈ Y , then
z /∈ Y and z′ Â z again. Therefore, (5c) holds for Â′′ and Â. Meanwhile, M(X,Â′′) = {x},
hence M(X,Â) ≥∧ M(X,Â′′) does not hold.
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Proposition 5.6. Let A be a lattice and Â be an ordering on A. Then the following
statements are equivalent.
1. Â satisfies (8c).
2. There holds M(X,Â′) ≥∨ M(X,Â) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(4b) holds on X.
3. There holds M(X,Â′) >> M(X,Â) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(4c) holds on X.
4. There holdsM(X,Â′) ≥∨ M(X,Â) whenever X ∈ LA, #X ≤ 4, and Â′ is an ordering
on A such that (4c) holds on A.
The proof is dual to that of Proposition 5.5.
Proposition 5.7. Let A be a lattice and Â be an ordering on A. Then the following
statements are equivalent.
1. Â satisfies (8d).
2. There holds M(X,Â) ≥∨ M(X,Â′) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(5b) holds on X.
3. There holds M(X,Â) ≥wV M(X,Â′) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(5d) holds on X.
4. There holdsM(X,Â) ≥∨ M(X,Â′) whenever X ∈ LA, #X ≤ 4, and Â′ is an ordering
on A such that (5a) and (5b) hold on A.
5. There holds M(X,Â) ≥wV M(X,Â′) whenever X ∈ LA, #X ≤ 4, and Â′ is an
ordering on A such that (5b) holds on A.
The proof is dual to that of Proposition 5.4.
Proposition 5.8. Let A be a lattice and Â be an ordering on A. Then the following
statements are equivalent.
1. Both conditions (8a) and (8c) hold.
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2. There holds M(X,Â′) ≥Vt M(X,Â) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(4a) and (4b) hold on X.
3. There holds M(X,Â′) ≥Vt M(X,Â) whenever X ∈ LA, #X ≤ 4, and Â′ is an
ordering on A such that (4a) and (4b) hold on A.
The equivalence immediately follows from Propositions 5.4 and 5.6.
Proposition 5.9. Let A be a lattice and Â be an ordering on A. Then the following
statements are equivalent.
1. Both conditions (8b) and (8d) hold.
2. There holds M(X,Â) ≥Vt M(X,Â′) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(5a) and (5b) hold on X.
3. There holds M(X,Â) ≥Vt M(X,Â′) whenever X ∈ LA, #X ≤ 4, and Â′ is an
ordering on A such that (5a) and (5b) hold on A.
The equivalence immediately follows from Propositions 5.5 and 5.7.
Remark. Agliardi (2000) called a function u on a lattice A pseudosupermodular if the
ordering represented by u satisfies (8a) and (8c). In the light of Propositions 5.8 and 5.9,
it might be appropriate to call an ordering pseudosupermodular upwards [downwards ] if
it satisfies (8a) and (8c) [(8b) and (8d)].
Sufficient conditions for monotonicity of the best responses (in one sense or another)
are obtained as easy corollaries. Given a poset T , a monotonic pseudopartition of T
consists of two subsets T ↑, T ↓ ⊆ S such that ∀t′, t ∈ T [t′ > t ⇒ [t ∈ T ↑ or t′ ∈ T ↓]].
Clearly, any two points outside T ↑ ∪ T ↓ must be incomparable.
Proposition 5.10. Let U = 〈Ât〉t∈T be a parametric family of orderings on a lattice A;
let U satisfy the strict single crossing condition. Let there be a monotonic pseudopartition
〈T ↑, T ↓〉 of T such that Ât satisfies (8c) for t ∈ T ↑ and (8b) for t ∈ T ↓. Then every RX
(X ∈ LA) is increasing w.r.t. >>.
Proof. Let t′ > t. If t ∈ T ↑, then (8c) holds with Ât as Â while (4c) holds with Ât′ as Â′ and
Ât as Â. Therefore, RX(t′) >> RX(t) for every X ∈ LA by Statement 3 of Proposition 5.6.
14
If t′ ∈ T ↓, then (8b) holds with Ât′ as Â while (5c) holds with with Ât as Â′ and Ât′ as Â.
Therefore, RX(t′) >> RX(t) for every X ∈ LA by Statement 3 of Proposition 5.5.
Proposition 5.11. Let U = 〈Ât〉t∈T be a parametric family of orderings on a lattice A;
let U satisfy the lower single crossing condition. Let there be a monotonic pseudopartition
〈T ↑, T ↓〉 of T such that Ât satisfies (8a) for t ∈ T ↑ and (8b) for t ∈ T ↓. Then every RX
(X ∈ LA) is increasing w.r.t. ≥∧.
Proposition 5.12. Let U = 〈Ât〉t∈T be a parametric family of orderings on a lattice A;
let U satisfy the upper single crossing condition. Let there be a monotonic pseudopartition
〈T ↑, T ↓〉 of T such that Ât satisfies (8c) for t ∈ T ↑ and (8d) for t ∈ T ↓. Then every RX
(X ∈ LA) is increasing w.r.t. ≥∨.
Proposition 5.13. Let U = 〈Ât〉t∈T be a parametric family of orderings on a lattice A; let
U satisfy the single crossing condition. Let there be a monotonic pseudopartition 〈T ↑, T ↓〉
of T such that Ât satisfies (8a) and (8c) for t ∈ T ↑, and (8b) and (8d) for t ∈ T ↓. Then
every RX (X ∈ LA) is increasing w.r.t. ≥Vt.
Proposition 5.14. Let U = 〈Ât〉t∈T be a parametric family of orderings on a lattice A;
let U satisfy the weak single crossing condition. Let there be a monotonic pseudopartition
〈T ↑, T ↓〉 of T such that Ât satisfies (8a) for t ∈ T ↑ and (8d) for t ∈ T ↓. Then every RX
(X ∈ LA) is increasing w.r.t. ≥wV.
Each proof is quite similar to that of Proposition 5.10.
Remark. Lemma 3.1 of Kukushkin et al. (2005) immediately follows from Proposi-
tion 5.13 (T ↑ = T ).
6 Main characterization results
Theorem 1. An ordering Â on a lattice A is quasisupermodular if and only if both
following requirements are satisfied.
1. There holds M(X,Â′) ≥Vt M(X,Â) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(4a) and (4b) hold on X.
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2. There holds M(X,Â) ≥Vt M(X,Â′) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(5a) and (5b) hold on X.
Moreover, both requirements can be restricted to X ∈ LA with #X ≤ 4.
Proof. The equivalence immediately follows from Propositions 5.8 and 5.9.
Theorem 2. An ordering Â on a lattice A is quasisupermodular if and only if all the
following requirements are satisfied.
1. There holds M(X,Â′) >> M(X,Â) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(4c) holds on X.
2. There holds M(X,Â) >> M(X,Â′) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(5c) holds on X.
3. There holds M(X,Â′) ≥wV M(X,Â) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(4d) holds on X.
4. There holds M(X,Â) ≥wV M(X,Â′) whenever X ∈ LA, Â′ is an ordering on X, and
(5d) holds on X.
Moreover, all requirements can be restricted to X ∈ LA with #X ≤ 4.
Proof. The equivalence immediately follows from Propositions 5.4–5.7.
To present our last characterization result, somewhat cumbersome terminology is
needed. Let T and T ′ be two posets such that T = T ′ \ {t0} (t0 ∈ T ′); let U ′ = 〈Ât〉t∈T ′
be a parametric family of orderings on a lattice A, and U := 〈Ât〉t∈T . We say that U ′
is an extension of U with the single crossing property if (4a) and (4b) hold for Ât0 as Â
and Ât as Â′ whenever T 3 t > t0, whereas (4a) and (4b) hold for Ât as Â and Ât0 as Â′
whenever t0 > t ∈ T . Similarly, U ′ is an extension of U with the strict [weak ] single
crossing property if (4c) [(4d)] holds for Ât0 as Â and Ât as Â′ whenever T 3 t > t0, whereas
(4c) [(4d)] holds for Ât as Â and Ât0 as Â′ whenever t0 > t ∈ T .
We say that an ordering Â on a lattice A preserves ascendance if, whenever U is a
parametric family of orderings on A such that RX defined by (2) is increasing w.r.t. ≥Vt
for every X ∈ LA, and U ′ is an extension of U with the single crossing property such
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that Ât0 coincides with Â, every correspondence R¯X (X ∈ LA) defined by (2) for U ′
is increasing w.r.t. ≥Vt. Similarly, an ordering Â on a lattice A preserves strong/weak
ascendance if, whenever U is a parametric family of orderings on A such that RX defined
by (2) is increasing w.r.t. >>, respectively ≥wV, for every X ∈ LA, and U ′ is an extension
of U with the strict/weak single crossing property such that Ât0 coincides with Â, every
correspondence R¯X (X ∈ LA) defined by (2) for U ′ is increasing w.r.t. >>, respectively
≥wV.
Theorem 3. Let Â be an ordering on a lattice A. Then the following statements are
equivalent.
1. Â is quasisupermodular.
2. Â preserves ascendance.
3. Â preserves both strong ascendance and weak ascendance.
Proof. The equivalence immediately follows from Theorems 1 and 2.
7 Concluding remarks
7.1. The description of preferences with an ordering may seem very general, but it may
also seem not general enough. Leaving aside the abstract question of how much rationality
in an agent’s preferences it is right to assume, there is a mundane reason to go beyond
orderings. Suppose the utility function u(x, t) is bounded above in x for every t, but
need not attain a maximum; then ε-optimization suggests itself strongly, and this means
considering a preference relation
y Ât x­ u(y, t) > u(x, t) + ε
(with ε > 0). R(t) consists of all ε-maxima of u(·, t). The relation Ât is a strongly acyclic
semiorder, but need not be an ordering. If u satisfies Topkis’s (1978) increasing differences
condition, then {Ât}t∈T satisfies the single crossing conditions; if u is supermodular in the
first argument, then Ât satisfies both (7). Nevertheless, none of the results of this paper
is applicable even under so strong assumptions; actually, R need not be ascending. The
existence of a monotone selection can be proven when both X and T are chains; the
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existence of an ε-Nash equilibrium, when every strategy set is a chain (Kukushkin, 2009,
Theorems 3 and 4). However, there is no similar result of any kind for non-scalar sets X.
7.2. Five “order” relations (3) form a lattice (with the logical implication as order); five
single crossing conditions [four (4) and the conjunction of (4a) and (4b) – single crossing
proper] form an isomorphic lattice. Neither is a sublattice of the lattice of all binary
relations on, respectively, BA or the set of orderings on A. Both will become sublattices
if we add the disjunction (meet) of ≥∧ and ≥∨, respectively, (4a) and (4b); even an analog
of Propositions 4.1–4.5 will hold. However, this additional “order” seems to lead to no
interesting result about, say, monotone selections.
7.3. Assuming Â represented with a mapping u from A to a chain, conditions (8) can be
written in a “more algebraic” style, cf. Agliardi (2000) (or Veinott, 1989, for that matter).
∀x, y ∈ A [u(y) ∨ u(x) > u(y ∧ x)⇒ u(y ∨ x) > u(y) ∧ u(x)]; (9a)
∀x, y ∈ A [u(y) ∨ u(x) ≥ u(y ∨ x)⇒ u(y ∧ x) ≥ u(y) ∧ u(x)]; (9b)
∀x, y ∈ A [u(y) ∨ u(x) ≥ u(y ∧ x)⇒ u(y ∨ x) ≥ u(y) ∧ u(x)]; (9c)
∀x, y ∈ A [u(y) ∨ u(x) > u(y ∨ x)⇒ u(y ∧ x) > u(y) ∧ u(x)]. (9d)
Clearly, each condition (9) is equivalent to the corresponding condition (8).
7.4. It would seem natural to develop analogs of Milgrom and Shannon’s Corollary to
Theorem 4 for other relations (3). Unfortunately, nothing interesting emerges: the mono-
tonicity of M(X,Â) in X ∈ L w.r.t. >> holds for any Â; the monotonicity of M(X,Â)
in X ∈ L w.r.t. ≥∨ (≥∧) holds if and only if Â is in(de)creasing; the monotonicity of
M(X,Â) in X ∈ L w.r.t. ≥wV is only possible if the agent is indifferent between all out-
comes. In each case, there is no connection to conditions for the monotonicity of optima
in a parameter influencing the preference relation.
7.5. A preference ordering Â on a lattice A is called strictly quasisupermodular if y∨x Â y
whenever x º y ∧ x and x and y are incomparable in the basic order. Whereas strict
single crossing is crucial for monotonicity w.r.t. >>, this property seems to play no role
here (nor in “type B” problems, see the previous item).
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